Posts by Matthew Poole
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Hard News: Key Questions, in reply to Rich of Observationz,
Quite. Other than advising on InfoSec, GCSB is an electronic intelligence gatherer. They don't run human intelligence assets (that's NZSIS's role). And that ELINT background goes back to their origins out of GCHQ, which is also why GCSB is historically run by people with a military signals background.
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Hard News: Key Questions, in reply to Paul Campbell,
56 times, I believe. 88 individuals. And I would expect representative charges rather than 56 individual counts, if that were to be pursued. The Greens (or maybe Mallard) may be considering laying a complaint with the police, in the same vein as was done regarding Dotcom, but I can't see the cops proactively sticking their noses into the matter. Whether that's a good thing or not is a totally different question.
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Hard News: Key Questions, in reply to Steve Barnes,
Well, for one thing, all government agencies are responsible for the security of their own systems; GCSB is only responsible for ensuring the security of GCSB systems. GCSB publishes guidelines (NZ Infrastructure Security Manual, or NZISM) which are required to be followed by agencies that handle classified material. NZISM sets out the rules (“must”, “must not”, “should”, etc) that networks and systems handling the different levels of information classification need to meet. GCSB also assesses and certifies cryptographic equipment for use in networks that transmit classified material between security zones. That’s it. They don’t go around and assess the security of every government agency’s IT systems, and they don’t even have the authority to demand that every government agency adhere to NZISM (for one thing, NZISM is only really useful if your agency handles classified material). GCSB is to information security in the national security public sector what NZSIS is to physical security: advisors, and publishers of guidelines. The agencies themselves are required to implement and comply with those guidelines, though they can ask for advice from the appropriate intelligence service.
Plus, if people are wigging out about GCSB gathering intel on behalf of other agencies’ warrants, imagine how they’d feel if GCSB spooks were poking around inside every single government agency’s IT systems!
See the Act if you want to know the GCSB’s objective and functions. They're not what you seem to think.
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Hard News: Key Questions, in reply to Steve Barnes,
As such it is responsible for the security of the Governments networks. So, how well have they done?
MSD’s leaky servers.
Hacking at the DOJ.
Leaks from the EQC.
and who knows what else has been left insecure while they spy on their own people?.It is responsible for advising on the security, when asked, and only organisations dealing with national security information are required to follow GCSB's directions on securing their information systems. It isn't responsible for the security of any of the systems you just listed.
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Hard News: Key Questions, in reply to Rob Stowell,
There sure as sh*t ain’t much evidence of this to date.
That's because there isn't one. It's a joke, and anyone who's paid attention knows it. I mean if they create one, because I know that right now it's the Intelligence Minister who chairs the Intelligence Select Committee, and the ISC has no powers to ask any questions of anything to do with the operations of the intelligence services. The ISC's membership is limited to receiving the full reports (not just the public bits) of the various agencies and swallowing whatever other bullshit the Chair deems them worthy of being fed. No other minister even gets to sit on the select committee that oversees their portfolio, never mind chairing it!
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Hard News: Key Questions, in reply to Sacha,
Oh, there’s no doubt about the intent that GCSB not initiate actions against NZ citizens and residents. That was always abundantly clear, and I don’t think I’ve suggested that it wasn’t. I’m questioning the existence of intent that GCSB be forbidden to assist other domestic agencies, which is not made terribly clear even by those quotes.
Let’s rephrase the question. NZSIS get an interception warrant for all internet traffic and telephone calls to/from a particular person and then go to the appropriate telco(s) to have that implemented. Who’s spying on the person? I would say it’s NZSIS, but the reaction in here suggests that many in here would say it’s the telco who’s spying. If so, then I understand your position and we’ll have to agree to disagree. If the reaction is consistent with mine, though, and we replace telco with GCSB, setting aside the legal situation what’s the difference as to who’s doing the spying? If GCSB isn’t determining the target, assessing the intelligence need, seeking the warrant, and making the requests for implementation, how are they different to an ISP or telco who’s been served with an interception warrant?
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Hard News: Key Questions, in reply to Keir Leslie,
Or we could just not do it: the capability creates the need.
That is the other option. I’m sure Keith Locke would be completely supportive of that course of action. But in the absence of a decision in that vein (which would, I suspect, have us skating mighty close to the edge of what’s required by various international agreements on anti-terrorism) someone needs to have the capability.
NZSIS are also external spies, if you weren’t aware. They run intelligence-gathering operations against foreign countries, in addition to running various kinds of operations domestically. There’s no blanket prohibition on the GCSB operating in NZ, either, only a prohibition on spying on NZ residents and citizens.
ETA: Given that GCSB are allowed to run operations within NZ, I’m unsure why you raise the spectre of their getting expanded powers. If they remain forbidden to run surveillance against NZ residents and citizens except under warrant from the domestic agencies nothing has changed from what was the situation prior to the 2003 Act. They used to do it, they’ve continued to do it, and unless someone presents Parliamentary debate from the passage of the 2003 Act that advises that the intent with that Act was to stop GCSB assisting other agencies (it certainly didn’t even attempt stop them from operating entirely within NZ) I’m going to continue with the presumption that it was bad drafting rather than deliberately flouting a law because it was inconvenient for other agencies to comply.
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Hard News: Key Questions, in reply to Trevor Nicholls,
The involvement of the GCSB has nothing to do with national security. They have capabilities for electronic surveillance that the police do not, and have been assisting the police with those services since long before the 2003 Act came into being.
As I observed above, if we don't make it legal for GCSB to undertake this surveillance on behalf of the spies and the cops then the spies and the cops will expect to be funded for that capability themselves. It's much, much more cost-effective to have GCSB as the sole supplier of that capability, and a hell of a lot easier to monitor if there's a proper oversight regime.
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Hard News: Key Questions, in reply to Trevor Nicholls,
Can some informed person direct me to the legal justification which allowed an organisation, putatively set up to protect the interests of national security, to operate so as to protect the commercial interests of a foreign corporation? Does cooperation with a NZ police investigation really extend that far?
Why aren't you asking why the Police are protecting the commercial interests of a foreign corporation? This entire fiasco is down to us bowing and scraping to the US government's ownership by Big Media.
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Ultimately, this surveillance “needs” (for varying definitions of the word) to happen. If the GCSB are not allowed to do it, NZSIS and the Police will seek (and doubtless be given) the necessary funding to establish and maintain the necessary internal capability. That will run to many millions of dollars, each, and for a capability that has been used between the two agencies an average of under nine times per year since the 2003 law change.
Unless we want the law changed so that such surveillance is off the cards entirely, I’d rather that there was a single agency being funded to carry it out. Because our intelligence services don’t appear to have a particular need for more money, and it’s sure as hell easier to keep a close eye on one than on three.