Hard News: Miracles just rate better, okay?
510 Responses
First ←Older Page 1 … 17 18 19 20 21 Newer→ Last
-
ChrisW, thanks for those links btw.
This is clearly science in action, but not by the same methodological rules that apply to say particle physics.
Indeed. It strikes me that science of the past almost always starts with "observe", and very seldom has "make predictions" as key parts of methodology, unlike physics which seems to be mostly the other way around. Physics seems to be the science most people turn to for inspiration on method, though, because experiment is so easy to conduct, the refutations of theories are so demonstrable. It's not nearly so easy when looking at dinosaur footprints - basically the conclusions are still highly debatable, and the way forward not nearly so clear. Maybe more of these footprints will be found, helping us form a clearer picture. Maybe not.
Some aspects of the study are amenable to physics-like methodology. The scientists could extrapolate from the hypothesis that these structures are footprints some conclusions that have not yet been observed, and go looking for those things - finding them as a result of such predictions would be strong corroboration for the theory. For instance, they could make some guesses about what kind of dinosaurs they were, and search similarly old geological sites for other indications of these dinosaurs, perhaps other fossils that would usually be found with these dinosaurs. But failing to find such things is not going to crush the theory, the way a failure of such a prediction would in physics. If light was not observed to bend around the sun after multiple attempts to observe this, Einstein's relativity theory would have suffered a big setback.
So, the quest for a full, necessary and sufficient definition of *the* scientific method is futile.
Well, that's the kind of claim Feyerabend makes. Although he tends to suggest it's worse than futile, that it might actually do harm. Paleontologists might find themselves out of funding, because they can't measure up to the standards of physicists, for instance.
I'm not so sure - a full, necessary and sufficient definition might not be futile, just really hard. It might be a very, very large description. To this extent I can't agree with Feyerabend on purely logical grounds. It seems to me that he's making a claim that could well be proved wrong in itself.
-
There’s a small passage on Feyerabend in Sokal and Bricmont’s Fashionable Nonsense. Their conclusion on AM seems to match closely with my (provisional) ones. They address his “anything goes” conclusion and point to it as an example of reasoning common to relativists. He starts with the correct observation “All methodologies have their limitations”, and jumps to the false conclusion [therefore] “anything goes”. They give the analogy of swimming: there are many ways to swim, all with the same basic aim (to stay afloat) and all with similarities and differences, and all with limitations. But it does not follow that anything goes and you can move around in the water any way you please and meaningfully call it swimming.
You admit to not having read Feyerabend, who is the actual subject of most of this debate.
The subject was the parts of Feyerabend’s views summarised in that Wiki article of you linked to, and other characterisations of his views espoused here. I said at the outset I don’t necessarily disagree with everything he wrote and would have to read more on Feyerabend to come to any more solid conclusions on his views. I raised some specific points of contention, most of which you have since dropped. I was not, despite your attempt to portray it otherwise, trying to offer a definitive method, but for the most part pointing out where I think he went too far with some of his conclusions. I never claimed that it was easy to define science or delineate what the scientific method was in a perfectly satisfactory way, but I didn’t agree with some of Feyerabend’s conclusions, and you’ve given little reason to reconsider. Where we seem to differ is that I think it reasonable to consider science (broadly) in methodological terms; that calling it a method, while not the full story, is a more satisfactory short answer than calling it an ideology. Both are glib, but the latter is more so.
Persecution takes many forms. ... it can be something you suggested above, the refusal to teach alternative ideas to children.
You refer here to the teaching of creationism, I presume? I certainly don’t think creationism should be taught in science classes. Do you think creationism should be taught in schools, alongside evolution and other conventional science? Taught as an equally valid way of explaining how we came to be here?
I don’t think anyone should be persecuted for their views per se. But what you called ‘systematized disadvantage’ is unavoidable, unless you accept the teaching of intelligent design, creationism, and for that matter other mythology as equally valid in explaining the world. I don’t agree with that kind of epistemic relativism.ideology
I don’t think ideology is a dirty word, but I do tend to think it gets used in a rhetorical way in these sorts of debates, to emphasise science needs to be seen as “a viewpoint.” Just about anything can be called a viewpoint - that’s banal. So the idea is to at least imply, or even say explicitly, it is just a viewpoint, no more or less valid than intelligent design or whatever you want to elevate.
I don't think you have a theory of science at all.
A precise one? No. I don’t need a precise theory to be able to criticise others’ positions. You have a nebulous theory yourself, yet you criticise other positions.
Your opinion on it seems to be 'whatever the majority of scientists think it is', which is of course a circular definition. All of your attempts to show that there is a method fall back on finding some source of authority on the matter. The more you do so, the wider you cast your net of definitions,
You’re confused. It isn’t circular to point to scientists' summaries to demonstrate broad agreement among scientists. Referring back to the same evidence I already cited is not casting the net wider.
An elaboration of the methods of every single scientific theory that you consider scientific?
It’s fair to say I consider all scientific theories to be scientific. Tautology’s what breathless hyperbole gets you, I guess.
[Philosophy of science] serves to lend to science an air of legitimacy, as though it rests on a bedrock of philosophical truth.
For whom? The layman doesn’t learn of ‘a bedrock of philosophical truth’ and use this to judge the validity of science. In fact that contradicts your claim that they judge science in non-methodological ways.
You asked how the world became convinced of the truth of Einstein's theory, and suggested it was because of the scientific method. I can see a plethora of other possibilities. It could be because he discovered something.
That’s weak. Why does the scientific community, and now largely I believe the world community, accept this as as factual, rather than ‘just a hypothesis’? I suggested that the methodology was essential. You suggest it wasn’t, even though you pointed to predictions and tests in your own summary. I’m sure physicists were impressed by his maths, but they still wanted the tests. As for results, that’s what he should be judged on - not sure what your point is there. Your mistake is in seeing the scientific approach as a discrete entity. However defined, it is a community and ongoing methodology. No one suggests Einstein went through every step of the method as he got up in the morning. His theorising was one part of the process, but he was subject to more than just a pat on the back for some good maths. At least some of his theories remain the subject of scientific methodology today, and it’s possible his theories could be refined or adjusted. Your whole Einstein example is on shaky ground. Your argument seems to be that because Einstein was ‘right first time’, there was no method. He was an example of a magician conjuring up knowledge about the world in an instant. That’s naive.
Perhaps you felt you were making a methodological claim when you said I tend to chuck the baby out with the bathwater.
On Ethics you took a codified sceptical position, and here there seems to be a parallel, although with more caveats on your part this time.
I've never claimed my view on science was typical. Indeed not many of my views on anything are 'typical'. I don't find beliefs being typical, normal, average, common, widely accepted, broadly supported, popular, as being particularly good reasons to agree with them. I never have. This has always made me deeply uncool, but I really don't care.
I suspect (with the possible exception of your position on the teaching of creationism in schools) your views are the more popular around forums like this than mine. I don’t care about how popular a belief is either, but that raises questions about the usefulness of increasing democracy in science. Anyway, I wasn’t referring to your own view of science; I was referring to your contention that science was generally portrayed in a certain way.
If light was not observed to bend around the sun after multiple attempts to observe this, Einstein's relativity theory would have suffered a big setback.
The hell you say! : )
-
He starts with the correct observation “All methodologies have their limitations”, and jumps to the false conclusion [therefore] “anything goes”.
To be honest, I think this claim of his is more in the nature of a 'bold claim' rather than something he felt followed from the logic of the limits of methodologies. It's a theory about science, which could be proved wrong. Being a very sweeping statement, it would be very easy to prove wrong, by the simple elaboration of the actual method. So...go for it. Prove it wrong by elaborating a method that does, indeed, perfectly characterize all of science. It will have to pass tests that tally with the past, then it could stand as a prediction of the future of science.
It does parallel relativism, but I don't think it's certain he is a relativist. In fact, I think Sokal and Bricmont are showing philosophical naivete in suggesting as much. He never said "anything goes" so far as truth is concerned. Only method. Scientific method, to be specific.
They give the analogy of swimming: there are many ways to swim, all with the same basic aim (to stay afloat) and all with similarities and differences, and all with limitations. But it does not follow that anything goes and you can move around in the water any way you please and meaningfully call it swimming.
And what a poor analogy it is. If you can move around in the water, without support, without drowning, then that is swimming. At least in my book. However you can manage it. It doesn't matter if you throw every rule you ever learned right out the window, if you can do that, then you are swimming. What a perfect way to make Feyerabend's point for him.
Where we seem to differ is that I think it reasonable to consider science (broadly) in methodological terms; that calling it a method, while not the full story, is a more satisfactory short answer than calling it an ideology. Both are glib, but the latter is more so.
I don't think either one is glib. They're both ideas worthy of consideration, and they could both be true. Science could be both a method and an ideology. The method is rather vague, but the choice to follow that vague methodology, to believe in the results of it, forms the ideology. I'm not sure why you're so bitter on the word, to be honest.
Re: Creationism. Yes, I think it should be taught of in schools, along with a number of other myths/theories, preferably from a wide range of cultures. I don't think a lot of time should be spent on it, nor do I know whether it should be taught in science classes. Science classes seem to be mostly geared towards gaining fluency in the orthodoxy of science, rather than learning its history. This is probably practical - there's only so much time, and the teachers are mostly trained in science, rather than history. Personally, I never found science classes to be places of discussion or debate - the focus was in learning a massive body of fact, as though it is fact, without any real consideration of alternatives, period. This is probably quite practical training for cranking out lots of engineers by the age of 20.
Actually, this goes for almost every subject taught at school. Mathematics was about the only subject in which attempts were made to prove points, probably because in maths things can actually be proved. Everything else boiled down to "because some authority says so". Perhaps I'm a dreamer to think that a better beginning to intellectual life could be found for our children. I think it would bring the point home that creation myths are arbitrary a whole lot better if kids got to see just how many of them there are, and how silly the ones we aren't brought up with sound, and how the justification for all of them is "because ancient people said so". Even more ancient than their teachers :-). It's when you try to sweep these things under the carpet that they actually get noticed. It could help with cultural tolerance amongst religious kids too.
I don't think the more sophisticated philosophical arguments for the existence of God should be taught generally, though - that should be elective, if taught at all. That's not science or history, it's philosophy and as we both know, a real time sink.
A precise one? No. I don’t need a precise theory to be able to criticise others’ positions.
I think it's built in to your criticism for it not to be precise. A precise theory could be refuted, but a vague one can be used for any purpose you like. Again, the refutation to Against Method is to come up with a method. It really is that easy.
You’re confused. It isn’t circular to point to scientists' summaries to demonstrate broad agreement among scientists. Referring back to the same evidence I already cited is not casting the net wider.
That wasn't what I was saying was circular, obviously. I was saying that your attempts to define science in that way are circular. Of course there is broad agreement amongst scientists, if your definition of scientists is 'people who follow this method'.
For whom? The layman doesn’t learn of ‘a bedrock of philosophical truth’ and use this to judge the validity of science. In fact that contradicts your claim that they judge science in non-methodological ways.
For people who are convinced by such things. Philosophical backing is important to a lot of people. They like to think that clever people have thought hard about the foundation of something they are going to place a lot of faith in. That doesn't contradict anything I said - people often have multiple sources for their beliefs. They might be even more impressed by important people in their lives holding (and espousing) the beliefs.
Your argument seems to be that because Einstein was ‘right first time’, there was no method.
Not at all. My argument is that you don't know what the method is, with any precision. In elaborating it (or should I say "linking to a number of other peoples elaborations, none of which were identical") you haven't given any clear way of designating what activities are scientific and which are not.
Now I'm well aware that you can fully continue to just hold the line that there is a method and refuse to be precise about what it is. But if so I'm sticking to my claim that your position is not as far from Feyerabend's as you might think. He was not arguing that no methods are ever used. He was not arguing that no method is ever useful. What he was arguing against was the idea that there is one method by which you can reliably distinguish science from non-science.
I don’t care about how popular a belief is either, but that raises questions about the usefulness of increasing democracy in science.
It's a very sticky question, and not just for science, but for democracy generally. The fact that truth is often unpopular. But I think democracy is still the best system, people should be party to big decisions that affect them, decisions that involve massive amounts of money, for instance. As long as science receives government funding, ultimately there is a right to choose how that money is spent that transcends the desires of scientists. There is also a right to make judgments about scientific practices that are immoral.
-
He never said "anything goes" so far as truth is concerned. Only method. Scientific method, to be specific.
Which is exactly what Bricmont and Sokal were addressing. They noted he did claim later that he was taken too literally in the ‘anything goes’ claim, arguing that he wasn’t against proceeding without rules and standards, just that all rules have their limits and there is no comprehensive rationality. Trouble is, as they point out, how could he justify any rules or standards without them being constrained by some rationality? If not, you arrive at the most extreme relativism.
If you can move around in the water, without support, without drowning, then that is swimming. At least in my book. However you can manage it. It doesn't matter if you throw every rule you ever learned right out the window, if you can do that, then you are swimming.
But you can’t move around any way you please and stay afloat. All methods of swimming have their limitations, but it isn’t true that all bodily movements are equally valid in terms of the aim of staying afloat – some will just lead to sinking. All methods of swimming have their limits, but it clearly does not follow that ‘anything goes’.
Science could be both a method and an ideology.
That’s my position. You just seem to be agreeing with my previous characterisation of our positions: I prefer ‘a method’ or similar labels to characterise science, you prefer ‘an ideology’.
Creationism
You dodged the question: should it be taught as an equally valid way of explaining how we came to be here? If not, it will be at a systematised disadvantage.
Btw, I’m not against teaching philosophy in schools. In fact it might be worth considering. More here.
That wasn't what I was saying was circular, obviously. I was saying that your attempts to define science in that way are circular.
They weren’t my attempts to define science, they were my answer to your request for evidence that the agreement was broad. You’ve offered no counter evidence. To be honest, I would have thought it a fairly unremarkable claim, and I’m not sure why you’re so stuck on this point.
For people who are convinced by such things.
It lends an air of legitimacy for... those it lends such as air to? Now there’s some circular reasoning. I rather doubt there are a lot of people out there particularly concerned with philosophising over what the scientific method is. In as much as they trust science, it is because they see science and technology working in their daily lives.
Not at all. My argument is that you don't know what the method is, with any precision.
Weird, because I’m pretty sure when you brought up that example, it was in response to Brent, not me. Anyway, I can’t be bothered teasing out your attempts at this straw man line again.
It's a very sticky question, and not just for science, but for democracy generally. The fact that truth is often unpopular. But I think democracy is still the best system, people should be party to big decisions that affect them,
Yeah, but as I said earlier, we do live in a democracy. People can have input into scientific funding and policy in much the same way they do for other state activities. I don’t see any need to significantly increase the amount of direct say people have in science policy and funding. But you seem more in favour of direct democracy in general.
-
Trouble is, as they point out, how could he justify any rules or standards without them being constrained by some rationality?
He doesn't try. If you don't think such things are rational, why bother? To even choose rationality is a choice that sits outside of rationality.
But you can’t move around any way you please and stay afloat. All methods of swimming have their limitations, but it isn’t true that all bodily movements are equally valid in terms of the aim of staying afloat – some will just lead to sinking.
If you sink then you're not swimming any more. I never said every way of swimming was equally good, just that the definition of the act lies entirely in what it achieves, not how it is done.
>Science could be both a method and an ideology.
That’s my position. You just seem to be agreeing with my previous characterisation of our positions: I prefer ‘a method’ or similar labels to characterise science, you prefer ‘an ideology’.
Actually, I don't prefer any such thing. I think that both the labels are imprecise, hence my position that it could be either one or both. Not that it is either one. I don't really care for such a definition debate, it doesn't elucidate anything, it's just a rhetorical position, a battle over the meaning of words in the English language. It tells us nothing about science as a concept, only as a word. I think at best that both words might help us to understand science in an extremely vague way, a starting point, like all dictionary definitions. Or in a discussion, they could help us to think in new and novel ways.
You dodged the question: should it be taught as an equally valid way of explaining how we came to be here? If not, it will be at a systematised disadvantage.
I did not answer that specific question, sure. I thought it rather obvious that my answer would be No, I don't think it should be taught as 'equally valid' to, say, modern cosmology, but the reasons for that should be laid on the table for students to see. Having been laid so, the question is laid to rest far more effectively than "because Mr Grumpypants Science Teacher (who I hate) dismisses Creationism out of hand".
Btw, I’m not against teaching philosophy in schools.
I'm not against it either, I think it would make a great elective. I doubt its value as a core subject though. I used to think it should be, until I met a teacher who taught it as part of International Bachelaureate. She was fascinated that I had a degree in it, and pumped me. I quickly worked out that she was considerably more philosophically naive than any first year Philosophy student, basically having never even thought about many of the angles of what she was teaching to these kids. So, I became a little more guarded in my opinion on the matter - I figure that it could be very hard to find good teachers of philosophy. This problem is as old as Socrates, as The Protagoras shows. I could be being very harsh on her, perhaps her students got a lot out of her course.
They weren’t my attempts to define science, they were my answer to your request for evidence that the agreement was broad. You’ve offered no counter evidence. To be honest, I would have thought it a fairly unremarkable claim, and I’m not sure why you’re so stuck on this point.
And I'm not sure why you can't even acknowledge it. My point is that proving broad consensus on the meaning of a term under discussion is impossible, since the very pool of people amongst whom the consensus is to be formed are defined by the term.
It lends an air of legitimacy for... those it lends such as air to?
Yes. I'm not going to say who all these people are. That would be both impossible and irrelevant. I'll give exactly ONE example. YOU are such a person. It seems to me that the philosophical background of a belief set matters to you. Do you dispute this? Do you think you are unique? Or even uncommon, for that matter?
Weird, because I’m pretty sure when you brought up that example, it was in response to Brent, not me.
Sure, but Brent was following up on your linked definitions, which pretty much tallied with his one-sentence definition of science.
Yeah, but as I said earlier, we do live in a democracy. People can have input into scientific funding and policy in much the same way they do for other state activities. I don’t see any need to significantly increase the amount of direct say people have in science policy and funding. But you seem more in favour of direct democracy in general.
We do live in a democracy, but a lot of people don't. Feyerabend grew up under Nazi Germany, serving on the Eastern Front, so that might help contextualize just exactly how he sees the right of state funded science to claim a position that has no public oversight, and exactly how far powerful people can twist science towards immoral and counterfactual positions. These days, in the First World, his position sits between a Godwin and a straw man, but it wasn't so long ago that it was a very large concern, and it could move that way again.
As for my position on democracy in science, I tend to think that it's mostly sorted, these days. The science I do is 100% private, and I don't have a problem with that.
-
Ben wrote:
Sure, but Brent was following up on your linked definitions, which pretty much tallied with his one-sentence definition of science.
I did not intend my sentence to be a definition of Science. But your attempted counter-example of Einstein was just using a narrow definition of "looking at something". If this was broadened to include "thinking about something" then it is no longer a counter-example.
I originally found this discussion interesting, but of late it has been less so. (Especially Ben's seemingly arrogant - but more probably exasperated - rant about how poorly read everybody he ever argues against is). I am unconvinced by Ben's arguments to justify the claim that science is just an ideology that could end up being replaced. I do acknowledge that Science is not adequately defined. But then neither are a lot of things, such as life, planets, etc. Hell, just trying to define a coffee cup so that all such cups are included, and no non-cups are included is bloody difficult (unless one resorts to tautologies).
Ben wrote :
It seemed to me that philosophers really have little place in science, and it seems weird to me that scientists still seem to love Popper.
I did the Philosophy of Science paper (by Robert Nola), and I wasn't overly enamoured with Popper. I used to maliciously sum up his position as "To be scientific, it must be falsifiable. The only way to prove something is falsifiable is to prove it false. Hence, only false things are scientific". (I used to naively state - to the amusement of friends - "Popper was a jerk", until my Mother countered with "No he wasn't". Turns out she spent some time at Uni with him - that surprised me - I had assumed that (like all philosophers) he was long dead, and was also unaware of his NZ connections).
Cheers,
Brent. -
I just wrote something on the order of 2000 words answering Brent. Then I deleted it all, because I'm getting tired of talking about other people's opinions on science and having them held up as my own, and tired of hearing Steve's opinion on what other peoples opinions are about it too, since that leaves both of us stuck with making strawmen.
I wrote a slightly lengthier post on my own actual opinion. Some shitty quirk of Internet Explorer on my netbook which I just got today lost the entire lot because I was logged out during the writing of the post.
So, if anyone wants to know anything futher about the opinions of various philosophers of science, go read them. No more posts from me unless some new material comes up.
-
Trouble is, as they point out, how could he justify any rules or standards without them being constrained by some rationality?
He doesn't try. If you don't think such things are rational, why bother?
So why say he isn’t a relativist, and didn’t think "anything goes" so far as truth is concerned?
If you sink then you're not swimming any more.
So you agree with: “... it does not follow that anything goes and you can move around in the water any way you please and meaningfully call it swimming.”
Actually, I don't prefer any such thing. I think that both the labels are imprecise, hence my position that it could be either one or both. Not that it is either one. I don't really care for such a definition debate, it doesn't elucidate anything, it's just a rhetorical position, a battle over the meaning of words in the English language. It tells us nothing about science as a concept, only as a word. I think at best that both words might help us to understand science in an extremely vague way
For the purposes of this discussion, you have preferred ‘ideology’ over ‘method’, and you have said that science was an ideology, and even once called it a religion. But this is funny, it seems your prediction has happened in reverse; you have come to agree with me. I was saying earlier that it was rhetoric to refer to science as religion or as an ideology, and that in as much as the latter is true, it’s vague and trite. My own use of ‘a method’ was only a general characterisation (I only suggested it when you asked me what else we could call science apart from ‘an ideology’.)
I did not answer that specific question, sure. I thought it rather obvious that my answer would be No, I don't think it should be taught as 'equally valid' to, say, modern cosmology,
That’s all well and good, but then you are left with systematized disadvantage. Another question you didn’t answer was “You seriously think science doesn’t work, in the sense I was referring to, better than Christianity?” That is, in getting us reliable knowledge about the way the world works. I guess your answer there is obvious too: Yes, it does.
And I'm not sure why you can't even acknowledge it. My point is that proving ...
You’ve moved the goal posts: you originally asked for evidence, not proof. The only comeback you’ve made on this is: “...how far do you think I have to look to find people making claims about being scientists and what their methods are? Every hair brained crackpot who does some experiments can, and frequently does make such a claim.” I’ll leave anyone still following this discussion to decide for themselves if they find your hair brained crackpots convincing.
It seems to me that the philosophical background of a belief set matters to you. Do you dispute this? Do you think you are unique? Or even uncommon, for that matter?
No, no, and yes. In the context of this discussion, as I said, I think for the most part your average person is mostly impressed by science because they see science and technology working in their daily lives, and not generally because they’ve read Popper, or Sokal and Bricmont for that matter.
Sure, but Brent was following up on your linked definitions, which pretty much tallied with his one-sentence definition of science.
Brent made his comments first, so he wasn’t following up my linked definitions at all.
Brent wrote:I did not intend my sentence to be a definition of Science. But your attempted counter-example of Einstein was just using a narrow definition of "looking at something". If this was broadened to include "thinking about something" then it is no longer a counter-example.
Thanks for confirming that. I took your meaning to be exactly as you say. Ben seems to think I’m “slithering” by saying that he was being too literal with your brief summary, but even at a most generous reading of his counter-example using Einstein, he’s not contradicted your original point, as you allowed for modifications or refinements. This led to ridiculous hyperbole on Ben’s part, which I found disappointing. Claims that my modifications and refinements were endless – that sort of thing. In fact there was at best one refinement, the one you alluded to about the wording of ‘looking at something’. Ben’s Einstein example soon became pedantry, as far as I could see.
-
Steve, I'd like to hand you the debate. You care about it enough, I think, to continue without me. I think you've given some fair criticisms of Feyerabend as resurrected by me. You've given some fair criticisms of me, on many levels. I don't know where you stand, other than against me, and invite you to take the floor.
If you think discussing science on a theoretical level can be done constructively, rather than dogmatically, I'm open to hear about it. I'm even sympathetic. This site or yours, you pick the turf.
I think I've made my position as clear as such a position can be made by me. So I won't be answering anything about it, unless it comes up discussing your own opinion. Not for a good long while anyway.
-
I assume that's more of your deadpan humour, asking me to take the floor!
This site or yours, you pick the turf.
It ain't my site, though, so I think if I ever decide to essay on the notion of science in any detail it'll be elsewhere. Like Brent, and I suspect you, I'm weary of the debate now, although earlier on I was enjoying it. I think science can reasonably be broadly described as a methodological approach, and that that's more useful than some other characterisations, such as 'an ideology', or 'a set of facts'. I think it is a very difficult (maybe impossible) undertaking to fully codify scientific method in a precise way. But it also seems to me that such codification is not necessary to disagree with some of Feyerabend's conclusions.
Post your response…
This topic is closed.